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Japanese Economic Success and the Curious Characteristics of 
Japanese Stock Prices 
 
Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung 
 
 
1.     Introduction 
The Japanese economy, after spectacular performance in the decades following 
World War II, has been surprisingly weak now for more than a decade.  Figure 1 shows 
this remarkable contrast.  From 1961 to 1989, Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
averaged a remarkable 6.37% annual growth rate.  From then on, Japan’s GDP has posted 
only a 1.67% average growth rate.   
Something substantial clearly happened to the Japanese economy at the end of the 
1980s.  Certainly, the Japanese stock market and real estate market both collapsed 
spectacularly.  But financial and real estate markets have collapsed before many times 
and in many countries, and the results are not always a decade of economic stagnation.  
Indeed, the US economy scarcely noticed the stock market collapses of 1907 and 1987.  
Why is the Japanese financial disarray of the late 1980s so difficult to transcend? 
Our key point is that Japanese economic institutions were well suited to both post 
war reconstruction and “catching up” with other advanced economies, but not to 
surpassing them.  We argue that Japan’s “catch up” was essentially complete by the late 
1980s.  The business-government cooperation and bank-centered corporate governance 
that served Japan well for decades are now ill-suited in critical ways to guiding Japan 
further forward.  Yet these institutions continue with an inertia that reduces Japan’s 
ability to find and invest in new economic opportunities, including new enterprises.  
In particular, we argue that a shift away from state and bank oversight and 
towards greater reliance on equity markets to allocate capital is desirable for Japan.   
However, such a shift is not feasible unless certain key institutional changes are made.  
These include the dismantling of intercorporate equity holdings, more transparent 
corporate decision-making, and corporate governance that is more responsive to 
shareholder pressure.  Finally, we are skeptical of arguments that such changes run 
counter to deep Japanese cultural traditions, and are therefore optimistic that they can be 
accomplished.   
 
2.    The Remarkable Triumph of the Japanese Economy 
  Economic growth is a complicated phenomenon, and Japan’s economic history 
since the Meiji Restoration suggests that Japanese know more about achieving and 
sustaining economic growth than most others.  This is clearly true.  Japan’s political, 
financial, and business leaders have presided over what is probably the greatest “rags to 
riches” story in the history of the world.  Japan in 1878 was an impoverished and 
backwards feudal country, little different from the most backward regions in the world in 
terms of the standard of living it provided for its people.  Japan in 2001 is one of the 
richest countries in the world, having accomplished in little more than a century what 
took many times longer for the United Kingdom, the United States, and other Western   2
economies.   Even Germany, though also late to industrialization, started from a higher 
base when Bismarck orchestrated its economic advancement in the late 19
th century.   
Economists from other countries should therefore speak cautiously when advising 
Japan about her economic policy.  This analysis of the current economic situation of 
Japan is offered in this spirit, as a way of thinking that might perhaps be useful, but that 
Japanese policy makers and business leaders surely will take or leave as they see fit.   
  In our view, Japan’s very success is the key to understanding the prolonged 
economic discord that began in the late 1980s. Figure 2 graphs the difference between 
Japan’s per capita GDP, measured at purchasing power parity in current US dollars, and 
the average per capita GDP of other leading free market economies (the other six G7 
countries less Germany), measured in the same way.
1 Although Japan began the process 
of industrialization in the late 19
th century, its economic development lagged that of the 
leading Western countries until 1989.  In the early 1970s, Japan’s per capita GDP was 
$5,960 versus $8,190 for the U.S. and some $2,000 below the average for the leading 
Western Countries.  In short, 1989 is the year when the Japanese economy 
unambiguously and indisputably “caught up” with the West. 
  We argue economic growth requires different institutions depending on an 
economy’s scope to grow by applying existing knowledge.  When an economy has great 
potential to grow by applying techniques and technology developed elsewhere, its main 
constraint is the availability of capital.  Consequently, institutions that promote 
investment and channel it into capital spending are needed.  Since many countries have 
passed through this phase of economic growth, many institutional arrangements exist for 
accomplishing this.  In contrast, when an economy has exhausted the potential of existing 
practices and technology, it can only grow further by devising new and superior practices 
or technology.  At this stage, the economy’s growth is constrained by its stock of 
knowledge.  Consequently, institutions that facilitate the rapid development and 
application of new technology and practices are needed.  The range of institutions that are 
known to promote this sort of growth (creative destruction) is much more limited.   
Different companies in Japan have employed each method of growth with 
considerable success.  For example, Japan’s great zaibatsu families built their prewar 
corporate empires largely by applying technology developed elsewhere in Japan. But 
Sony, one of Japan’s great technology leaders, has built its fortune by developing new 
technology, especially in the filed of miniaturization. Because of this, we argue that the 
seeds of a creative destruction-based economy exist in Japan. 
 
3.     The Growth of Businesses 
In free enterprise economies like Japan, national economic growth depends on the 
growth of private sector businesses – including listed corporations, private corporations, 
partnerships, private cooperatives, etc.  Therefore, to understand the nature of economic 
growth, we must begin with corporate growth, which includes both the growth of existing 
companies and the creation of new companies.  This section presents a simplified 
analysis of how corporations decide whether or not to grow that captures the essence of 
                                                 
1 The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  
We drop Germany because, like Japan, it had to rebuild its economy after the war and because the 
unification of East and West Germany affects German data during this period.  Data are from the World 
Bank.   3
what is taught in most business schools.  The same techniques are used to assess the 
viability of new businesses seeking financial backing.  In doing this, we are not departing 
from traditional macro economic thinking. We are merely going back to its root: 
macroeconomic performance is the sum of microeconomic performance.   
Moreover, King and Levine (1993) and a huge subsequent literature confirm that 
the sophistication of a country’s financial system is closely correlated with 
macroeconomic performance.  La Porta et al.  (1997, 1998, 1999), Morck et al.  (1998), 
and others also show that traditional financial management concern like corporate 
governance laws and the standing of investors in court also matter to macroeconomic 
performance.   Consequently it is useful to connect standard ways of thinking about 
corporate finance issues to macroeconomics.  This is the conceptual objective of this 
section. 
Two caveats are in order before we proceed further.  
First, in a real economy, not all growth is generated by private sector businesses.  
Government, state-owned enterprises, and not-for-profit enterprises account for a large 
fraction of GDP in many advanced economies, and Japan is no exception.  The objectives 
that direct the growth of these enterprises may differ substantially from the economic 
profit-seeking behavior that governs corporate growth.  However, the role of private 
sector businesses is arguably more fundamental.  Government organs and public sector 
enterprises exist because the private sector generates the tax revenue that let them survive 
without concern for economic profits.  Non-profit enterprises exist because of donations 
from businesses, governments, and individuals.  Personal incomes derive either from 
employment in the private sector or from employment by government, public sector 
enterprises, or non-profits.  The ultimate source of these funds is therefore also private 
sector businesses.  
Second, it is well-known that all businesses do not follow the economic profit-
seeking behavior mandated by corporate finance theory.  This is because the individuals 
who run businesses are wont to maximize their own utility, not economic profits, which 
accrue to others, such as the shareholders who legally own the firm.  Because this 
situation involves a breakdown in the duty of legal agents (managers) to act for the firm’s 
owners or principals (shareholders), it is called an agency problem.  An important 
consideration in designing economic institutions is their ability to constrain agency 
problems.  We shall return to this issue later in the paper.   
 
3.1    The Corporate Finance Foundations of Macroeconomics 
An economy’s gross national product is by definition the sum of its firms’ 
revenue minus outsourcing purchases, that is, its firms’ total value added, which is the 
compensation to workers and to capital owner.   
 
[1]  YR P tj t j jt =− ∑ () ,,  
 
where  Yt = GNP,  
  Rj,t = firm j’s revenue in period t 
  Pj,t = firm j’s outside purchase   
   4
With offsets in the purchases of intermediate inputs (which = other firms’ value 
added), Yt is the economy’s total value added, i.e., its total labor earnings and capital 
earnings, which can be broken into two components: normal capital returns and economic 
profits.  
Conceptually, we can write  
 
[2]  () ,, , , , ,, RP w Lr K jt jt jt jt jt jt jt − = + + π  
 
Here, wj,tLj,t is labor cost, rj,tKj,t is the rental price of capital, and πj,t is firm j’s economic 
profits in period t.   
  When a business considers undertaking a new project i (expanding), it calculates 
the net present value (NPV) of doing so as 
 




















where the discount rate, rt, is the cost of capital in period t; fi,j,t is the increased net cash 
flow investment project i will generate for firm j in future period s; Kijt is the capital 
spending needed in period t to finance project i, E is the expectations operator and Ψt is 
the information set known at time t  to the decision maker.   We assume that all 
investment projects are paid for in one period and provide returns in the form of 
increased cash flows in subsequent periods.  Note that  
 
[4]  fijt = Rijt – Pijt – wijtLijt. 
 
To connect standard corporate finance models to standard economics models, we 
can take the additional cash flows from firm j setting up project i in period t to be a 
constant perpetuity, fij, beginning in period t + 1.  Consequently, we can write  
 










The firm’s expected economic profit in each subsequent period is then exactly  
 
[6]  [ ] [ ] ijt t t ij t ijt K r f − Ψ = Ψ E Eπ  
 
and is positive (negative) if the marginal revenue from the new project, fij, exceeds (is 
less than) the marginal cost of the current capital expenditure, rtKijt.  This simplification 
is not necessary to our argument, but perhaps does connect it to standard microeconomics 
more clearly. 
  In standard corporate finance theory, each firm j is assumed to confront a 
declining investment opportunity schedule, of the sort illustrated in Figure 3, so that for 
each successive project i costing Kjit, the additional perpetual subsequent cash flow fij is 
smaller.  Economic efficiency means the firm should invest in all projects that have 
positive NPVs (positive economic profits in the perpetuity simplification) and then stop.     5
If we take the cost of capital, rt, as constant, and the level of technology and other 
relevant features of the economy as fixed, all firms come to a steady state where 
[ ] 0 = − Ψ ijt t ij rK f E .   
We can rewrite this as  
 





















   
 
for project i the marginal capital investment firm j undertakes.  That is, qjt is the marginal 
Tobin’s q ratio of firm j at time t, for  [ ]
r
f t ij Ψ ˆ E
 is the market value investors in financial 
markets, using the information set  t Ψ ˆ  available to them, assign to the marginal 
investment project; while Kijt is that project’s replacement cost.    
Economic efficiency means that firms should undertake further investment 
projects as long as their marginal q ratios exceed one, and stop investing when their 
marginal  q ratios fall to one.  Note that this works only if  t t Ψ = Ψ ˆ ; that is, if the 
information available to investors is the same as the information available to investors.  
 
3.2    Implications 
  Several messages follow from this simple algebraic restatement of economic 
identities: 
 
(i)  Corporate growth is treated as a disequilibrium phenomenon in standard 
corporate finance classes at business schools throughout the world.  This is 
because NPVs are positive only where economic profits (quasirents) are 
positive, and corporations are not supposed to undertake additional capital 
investment unless the NPV of doing so is positive.   
 
(ii)  Poor corporate governance leads firms to stop either too soon or too late along 
their investment opportunity schedules.  This causes the macroeconomy’s total 
output to be suboptimal. 
 
(iii) Firms  investment opportunity schedules are usually taken as given, or as 
shifting due to exogenous factors.  For example, an exogenous technological 
breakthrough (an exogenous increase in the information set Ψt to Ψt+1 > Ψt) 
shifts a firm’s upwards, stimulating investment and growth.  So does an 
exogenous surge in demand for the firm’s products.  
 
(iv)  In the absence of an exogenous technological breakthrough, corporate growth 
must come from investment in knowledge at a rate that is compatible with the 
expected cash flows newly created knowledge can generate.  That is, Ψt+1 = 
g(R&D,Ψt) This is the gist of Schumpeter’s (1912) theory of creative   6
destruction as the engine of growth in a free enterprise economy, as modeled 
by Romer (1986) and others.   
 
4.      Exogenous Technological Change and “Catch Up” Growth 
  Technological change in the western world has primarily been embodied in 
capital.  Because of this, any emerging market economy that seeks to grow by absorbing 
knowledge developed in other economies requires considerable capital accumulation.   
We incorporate knowledge into our model be denoting the level of knowledge 
available by Ψt.  We use the term knowledge to mean not just scientific and engineering 
knowledge, but managerial know-how, marketing ability, and all the other types of 
knowledge that contribute to economic prosperity in developed economies.   
 
4.1     The Nature of “Catch Up” Growth 
“Catch up” growth comes about when knowledge from outside the economy 
becomes available, increasing Ψt by ∆Ψt.  A discrete increase in Ψt causes an across the 
board increase in the additional cash flows the company can achieve from its whole 
investment opportunity schedule of possible expansion projects.
















 for all investment projects i that firm j might undertake in period t.  
This raises the NPVs of a generic capital investment project to 
 













and firms consequently acquire new capital goods to grow because projects that were not 
economically sound in the past now make sense.  Positive NPVs abound, and pure 
economic profits or quasirents  ijt t ij ijt K r f − = π >>0 are expected to be plenteous for 
those with access to capital.   
 
4.2    Who Gets the Quasirents of Economic Growth? 
  Corporate finance theory posits that shareholders are residual claimants of the 
firm’s economic profits.  Economic profits may indeed accrue to shareholders.  But they 
could also flow to creditors, managers, workers, or the state.  Their precise ultimate 
disposition probably depends on complicated bargaining models that are beyond the 
scope of this study.   
Certainly, top corporate executives did well as Japan caught up.  Despite their 
relatively low base salaries, the top executives of Japan’s greatest corporations presided 
over “entertainment spending” budgets.
  Morck and Nakamura (1999) report that the 
                                                 
2 An alternative definition of increased knowledge is the replacement of the firm’s old investment 
opportunity schedule of cash flow perpetuities generated by possible investment projects with a new 
schedule. Some of the firm’s old projects might then become unviable as new projects become viable.  This 
situation would require us to consider disinvestment and downsizing for some firms, and is clearly a more 
realistic definition of technological development.  However, for the moment, we restrict ourselves to this 
more limited definition.   7
entertainment expenses of Japanese firms totaled ¥6.14 in 1991. In comparison, total 
R&D spending that year was ¥9.74 trillion. Some students of Japanese business stress the 
importance of networking and view entertainment costs as a prudent investment. We are 
skeptical of this interpretation, and are unaware of any hard evidence to back it up.  It 
seems more plausible to interpret corporate entertainment spending as consumption by 
top executives.   
The employees of Japan’s largest firms also did well, with job security far in 
excess of that available to their North American peers.   
Politicians and powerful lobby groups, like farmers, probably ended up with large 
portions of these economic profits too.  Certainly, in countries earlier along the path of 
catch up growth, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, Marcos and Suharto relatives 
appear to have served as quasirent sinks.    
In Japan, banks probably also captured substantional quasirents. Caves and 
Uekusa (1976) show that main banks charge their client firms higher than market interest 
rates.  For keiretsu firms, this premium is proportional to dependence on group financial 
institutions. Yet Nakatani (1984) shows keiretsu firms to be more levered than 
independent firms. Aoki (1988) describes these high debt costs as an agency fee paid by 
individual shareholders [for bank monitoring]. However, Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
find no evidence that bank monitoring benefits shareholders, and Morck et al.  (2000) 
find evidence of a negative effect on share value for most Japanese firms.    
Japanese banks may also have organized transfers of these quasirents between 
companies.  Hoshi et al. (1990) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that banks also 
orchestrated transfers from profitable firms to firms in financial distress.  Hoshi et al. 
emphasize the positive aspects of this inter-corporate insurance.  Morck and Nakamura 
argue that these transfers amounted to economically suspect bail outs of poorly governed 
firms closely associated with bank keiretsu groups, and had little stabilizing effect on 
other firms.  They argue instead that these transferred quasirents served to obfuscate 
corporate governance problems in the firms that received them.   
 
4.2    Economic Institutions for Catch-Up Growth 
Note that  [ ] [ ] ijt t t ij t ijt K r f − Ψ = Ψ E Eπ  >> 0, so firms need only raise new capital at 
the historic cost r, or at a cost not greatly higher, to expand profitably and capture the 
readily available streams of quasirents { ijt π }.  Access to large quantities of cheap capital 
is critical, so the economic institutions necessary to support “catch up” growth are those 
that facilitate a high savings rate and ready financing for business expansion.   
Corporate governance, or the quality of the individual capital budgeting decisions, 
is only of secondary importance, for the abundant quasirents make virtually any 
expansion profitable.  The future cash flows project i will produce for firm j in period t 
are estimated with an error  ijt π , so  ijt ijt t ij ijt K r f η π + − = .   
First, who runs the company is unimportant because keeping  ijt π  from being too 
large easy.   The technology and business practices needed are known, and must only be 
replicated.  Practical problems in setting up the productive facilities needed have been 
solved elsewhere.   Selling the products is straightforward, as their usefulness has been 
demonstrated in other countries.     8
Second, who makes the decision matter little because  [ ] [ ] ijt t t ij t ijt K r f − Ψ = Ψ E Eπ  
>> 0.  Even a big error in  ijt π  still leaves  ijt ijt t ij ijt K r f η π + − = >> 0 most of the time.   
Third, the appropriation of cash flows by management or other parties can be 
quite large, biasing  ijt π  deep into negative values, yet  ijt π  can remain well above zero.   
Because of these factors, firm-level corporate governance is unimportant as long 
as huge errors and gross theft by corporate insiders are avoided.  Brilliant managers are 
unnecessary.  Any reasonably honest person can do a workmanlike job as a corporate 
decision-maker, and the firm can capture at least some of the quasirents that are there for 
the taking.   
 This wide leeway is probably why different countries have successfully used very 
different corporate governance systems while “catching up”.  Bismarck encouraged large 
banks to take an active role in developing Germany.  Malaysia’s government entrusts its 
corporate assets to politically anointed corporate executives to fulfill carefully balanced 
racial representation objectives.  Japan entrusted its economic development to powerful 
families in the prewar period, and to bankers and MITI bureaucrats in the postwar period.  
Great Britain absorbed foreign, primarily Dutch, technology and business practices after 
the Glorious Revolution, and used a stock market to allocate capital.  United States 
businesses relied heavily on various banking regimes, the stock market, preferred equity, 
and traded bonds as that country caught up with Britain during the 19
th century.    
This kaleidoscope of institutions suggests that anything able to bring about the 
rapid accumulation of capital can support catch-up growth.  Japan’s banks and MITI 
industrial policies worked as well as any other alternative – and perhaps better than 
many.  They were probably helped along by Japan’s policies of keeping saving within the 
country and in the banking system by banning corporate bonds.  The result was a large 
flow of capital channeled towards corporations at an artificially low cost.   
 
5.     Approaching the Knowledge Frontier 
Once an economy has absorbed all the readily available knowledge other 
economies can provide, further “catch up” growth due to the exogenous arrival of new 
knowledge is not possible.  The individual firms in other countries that develop new 
products and new processes keep these competitive edges secret, and intellectual property 
laws protect their rights to do so.  “ Catch up” growth would only become possible again 
if the country stagnated for a decade or two while other economies generated new 
knowledge, and then caught up again.   
Having reached the frontiers of knowledge, firms must prudently expend 
resources on research and development, market research, advertising, and the like, so as 
to increase Ψt themselves. Further growth that involves simply raising capital and 
investing it in more projects using current technology causes the firms to move too far 
out along their investment opportunity schedules, and to undertake projects with negative 
net present values.  That is, firms undertake an increasing number of projects with 
ijt t ij K r f <  and so with  0 < ijt π .   
  As the returns to further expansion grow ever more meager, strains appear in the 
country’s economic institutions.  Are some of these systems better than others at dealing 
with these strains?   
   9
5.1    Concentrated Banking and the Exploitation of Cheap Capital 
When a country has applied almost all the exogenously available additional 
knowledge,  [ ] [ ] 0 → − ∆Ψ + Ψ = ∆Ψ + Ψ ijt t t t ij t t ijt K r f E Eπ .  If the future is estimated with 
a large error  ijt π , the firm can increasingly often end up with economic profits 
ijt ijt t ij ijt K r f η π + − =  < 0.  The quality of the individual capital budgeting decisions starts 
to matter more, for quasirents are now less juicy.  The appropriation of cash flows by 
management or other parties can, biasing  ijt π  so that  [ ] 0 < Ψt ijt η E , is increasingly likely 
to leave  ijt π  below zero.   
One solution is to improve corporate decision-making and to find ways to expand 
the set of available knowledge further.  But this requires major changes in the way firms 
are run.  Is there a simpler solution? 
Japan and other East Asian countries have relied heavily on a concentrated 
banking industry to oversee their “catch up” growth, and both grew quite quickly.  This 
may not be a coincidence.  If firms’ increase in demand for capital pushes up the cost of 
capital,  rt, this would lower the present value of the additional cash flow the new 
technology makes possible and stops the firm’s expansion more sharply than if rt did not 
rise.   Taking this line of argument further, if rt can be pushed to an artificially low level,  
ijt ijt t ij ijt K r f η π + − =   can rise above zero, even if it would be negative at freely set cost 
of capital.   
This observation may explain the seemingly inordinate importance many Asian 
economies, including Japan, have put on keeping interest rates low while at the same time 
encouraging high savings rates.  Cheap and abundant capital extends the life expectancy 
of profitable “catch up” growth.   
Indeed, a quasi-monopolistic banking system that keeps interest rates low might 
be quite useful to those in charge of a country’s existing large firms in the final stages of 
“catch up” growth.  Bismarck is thought to have initially sanctioned deposit rate price 
fixing by banks to keep down the cost of capital for politically powerful Junker feudal 
landowners, who regularly borrowed and repaid funds over the agricultural cycle of 
planting and harvesting. However, the German banking system proved extremely 
resistant to change over subsequent decades - and in the postwar reconstruction decades.  
Perhaps political lobbying by those in charge of Germany’s existing large firms played a 
role in this.   Concern about agricultural lending also contributed political support to 
capping interest rates in the US in the 1930s.  These Regulation Q caps may have made 
post-depression reconstruction, a sort of “catch up growth” in which the civilian economy 
absorbed military technology such as jets and synthetic fabrics, economically viable for a 
longer period of time after World War II than would have been the case were interest 
rates in that country free to rise.   
Figure 4 shows that Japan’s real interest rates were comparable to those of the 
United States until 1976 (with the exception of a downward spike in Japanese real rates 
in the early 1970s due to a spurt of high inflation).  However, after 1976, Japanese 
interest rates have generally been one to two percentage points below US rates. Note also 
that Japanese per capita GDP growth dropped in the early 1970s – from the eight to ten 
percent range of the previous decade to the three to five percent range that persisted until 
the late 1980s.     10
The approaching end of catch up growth must have been apparent to Japanese top 
corporate executives and government officials some years in advance.  Perhaps strains to 
the viability of “catch up” growth, in the form of ever more marginal NPVs, began to 
show in Japan in the mid 1970s.  Government and corporate leaders may have found 
depressed interest rates an effective macroeconomic stimulus because this prolonged the 
economic viability of Catch up growth.  The cost of this was that firms moved further out 
on their investment opportunity schedules than would have been economically feasible 
had Japanese firms faced global market costs of capital.     
  This renewed growth lasted to the late 1980s, when Japan’s economy settled into 
its current doldrums.  This ultimate slow down should not have been unexpected, for low 
interest rates do not cure the problems associated with approaching the technological 
frontier, but only delay the critical adjustments by prolonging the economic viability of 
“catch up” economics.  By the late 1980s, Japan had unambiguously reached the 
technological frontier, and Japanese firms had moved beyond the efficient points of their 
investment opportunity schedules.  Interest rate price fixing could no longer help, and 
banks were left stretched by what, in retrospect, seemed excessively generous granting of 
credit. 
 
5.2    A  Bubbly Toast to Success 
  Interestingly, Japan’s real estate and stock market bubbles also occurred as 
Japan’s economy approached the global technological frontier.  Perhaps bankers and 
corporate executives began to find further unprofitable investment in plant and equipment 
increasingly hard to justify, and so sought alternative investments for the funds they 
could still obtain so cheaply from Japan’s great banks.  Stocks and real estate are obvious 
places to invest money while waiting for other opportunities to appear, and this doubtless 
occurred to many people simultaneously.  The result of this increased demand for stocks 
and real estate was to push stock and real estate prices higher, which served to justify the 
wisdom of those who invested in these assets and to attract further investment funds
  Kindleberger (1978) proposes that financial crises typically follow periods of 
abundant quasirents.
3  These periods of abundant quasirents are created by economic 
“displacements”, such as the beginnings of wars, armistices, revolutions, the erection of 
trade barriers, the lowering of trade barriers, free trade, crop failures, extraordinarily 
abundant crops, and virtually any other sudden large change that leaves the economy in a 
profound disequilibrium.  Kindelberger mentions radically new technology as a common 
source of such economic displacement.   
Certainly, the inflow of foreign technology into Japan on a vast scale over the past 
century and a quarter must have had profound effects of this sort.  Of course, Japan’s 
economy did not steadily absorb this technology in a continuous prosperity.  Political 
factors, wars, trade barriers, and wrenching institutional changes associated with post-war 
reconstruction were all important, and Japan experienced recessions, depressions, and 
asset price fluctuations like any other country.  However, the potential for earning 
economic profits by further developing Japan along the lines of the richest Western 
economies was never in serious doubt.   
                                                 
3  Kindelberger attributes this model to Minsky (1972), who attributes it to Keynes (1933).  The statement 
of it by Kindelberger is the clearest statement, and is also the most carefully supported with historical 
documentation.     11
  According to Kindelberger, These profound disequilibria create abundant 
quasirents; and those who capture these quasirents become very rich very quickly.  These 
high returns create a financial and monetary expansion, often in the form of vastly 
increased bank credit, and a general expectation of very high returns.  These general 
expectations may be legitimate for a time, as the economy adjusts to the new equilibrium, 
but they are not rational in the longer run.   
That irrationally high expected returns become pervasive is, however, is 
consistent with recent work in behavioral finance, summarized in Shleifer (2000), 
showing that people give excessive weight to recent experience in performing Baysian-
style updates of their expectations.  In the case of Japan, better than a century of catch-up 
economic growth convinced business and government decision-makers to expect an 
abundance of profit opportunities as long as basic criteria of monetary stability, capital 
availability, and institutional predictability were satisfied.   
  When quaisrents become scarce as the necessary economic adjustments near 
completion, the now overextended financial system and irrationally high expected returns 
give rise to what Kindelberger calls overtrading.  Overtrading is the bidding up of asset 
prices caused by a continued search for high returns that can no longer be justified by the 
real economy.  Overtrading engenders speculative bubbles - expectations of high capital 
gains - that, for a time, are self-fulfilling.  
This period of overtrading eventually creates fertile ground for confidence artists.  
When genuine high real return investments begin to dry up, swindlers join the fray, 
promising high returns that no investor would have taken seriously under normal 
circumstances, but that now seem plausible to investors, given their excessively 
optimistic expectations.  Ponzi schemes and other financial chicanery abound.  
Eventually, though, as more and more money seeking high returns pushes asset 
prices rise to increasingly dizzy heights, the disconnect of asset prices from the real 
economy becomes obvious.  Also, the inevitable exposure of frauds and swindles 
undermines investor confidence and triggers a reappraisal of expected returns and asset 
prices back to levels consistent with realistic long-term economic growth.   
Since much of the overtrading in genuine assets and investment in swindles of 
various sorts was financed with credit, Kindelberger argues that a stock market collapse, 
banking crisis, or the like, often follows.  If the financial system and the country’s 
corporate sector are unable to regroup and reinitiate normal economic growth, a 
prolonged economic crisis can also ensue. If the real economy is able to carry on 
unscathed, the financial crisis passes quickly. 
  Kindelberger (1978) establishes the general validity of this model with a detailed 
historical account of financial crises.  He investigates every significant economic and 
financial crisis in European and American economic history, and fits all of them to this 
pattern.   
  We argue that the economic crisis that beset Japan at the end of the 1980s is an 
example of this process.   Japan’s current problems follow a bout of overtrading, a 
classical bubble of the sort Kindelberger describes, and a financial crisis of the sort he 
argues typically follows.    However, Japan’s situation is not a typical case like the 
dozens of others Kindelberger reviews.  Japan cannot simply regroup its financial system 
and continue as before because Japan has now caught up – fully, completely, and finally.  
Further economic growth must now be qualitatively different, and requires different   12
institutions.  Hence, the lingering and apparently intractable nature of Japan’s economic 
doldrums.   
 
6.      Transcending the Knowledge Frontier 
  As figure 1 shows, Japan’s per capita GDP surpassed the average for other rich 
countries in 1989, cleanly marking the end of “catch up” growth.  This transition means 
that further growth by replicating existing property, plant and equipment will not 
generate positive economic profits.  Further growth instead requires investment in new 
technology, new products, new processes, and other innovations that can generate growth 
by creative destruction, which is the process that is believed to fuel continuing economic 
growth in the advanced industrial economies.   
 
6.1    Growth by Creative Destruction Replaces Growth by Capital Accumulation 
  Creative destruction was identified as playing this role by Schumpeter (1912).  
Entrepreneurs create innovations such as new products or production processes.  Since 
these innovations are not known to others, the entrepreneur has a monopoly on their use, 
and this monopoly generates economic profits for the entrepreneur and thus allows for 
the growth of his business. Indeed, the maximum social return to his innovation is 
achieved if his firm grows as rapidly as possible, for Marshall (1890), Jacobs (1985), 
Romer (1986), Porter (1990) and others argue that innovations typically have increasing 
returns to scale.  The return to the innovation is therefore largest if it is applied on the 
largest scale feasible.   
  Schumpeter (1912) argues that new firms are often required as vehicles through 
which innovations can be generally applied across the economy.  This is because those in 
charge of established firms have a vested interest in preserving the value of the (old) 
capital goods their firms own.  Innovations often make past investments in property, 
plant, and equipment obsolete.  Schumpeter chose the term creative destruction to 
encapsulate this destruction of the value of old capital goods by innovators’ creativity.     
  Schumpeter (1942), apparently influenced by the Great Depression and the 
apparent success of Soviet Communism and German National Socialism in the 1930s, 
qualified his earlier views somewhat, and argued that large established oligopolistic or 
monopolistic firms might instead be the best vehicles for generating and applying 
innovations.  This is because their monopoly profits can be used to fund innovation R&D 
while preserving corporate cultures and other intangible assets associated with the 
survival of the corporate entity.   
  In all likelihood, both versions of creative destruction have some validity.   Acs et 
al.  (1997) argue that each has advantages and disadvantages.   Innovation in large firms 
is held back because employees know that the benefits of any innovation they create 
accrue to the firm, not to themselves.  If the innovator owns her own small firm, her 
property rights over her innovation are more secure.  But small firms may have difficulty 
obtaining financial backing because the innovators who own them may have difficulty 
assessing their innovations’ economic viability and communicating this to potential 
backers.  Big firms flush with cash from quasi-monopolistic markets are in better 
positions to fund R&D.  But Betz (1997) raises another problem:  the managers of large 
firms may feel their dominant position threatened by new technology or business 
practices they do not understand.  Betz argues that top IBM managers delayed that firm’s   13
entrance into the personal computer business because, as mainframe computer engineers, 
they feared a loss of personal power if mainframes became less important to the 
company.   
  Empirically, new firms seem to be important.  He et al.  (2001) find that greater 
turnover in the list of a country’s largest corporations is empirically associated with 
higher productivity growth, and thus argue that the vested interests of those in charge of 
established corporations must be more economically important than the assets associated 
with corporate survival.  They conclude that productivity enhancing growth, which they 
associate with creative destruction, requires the emergence of new firms.   
  Regardless of whether creative destruction occurs via the formation of new 
innovative firms or via the continual R&D investment of established firms, corporate 
governance now takes on a primary importance it lacked during catch-up growth. 
Finding investments with  ijt ijt t ij ijt K r f η π + − =  > 0 requires investing to expand 
the information set available to the corporate decision-makers running firm j from 
t t ∆Ψ + Ψ  to  ) , & ( 1 , t t jt t j D R ∆Ψ + Ψ Ψ +  where  t Ψ is the country’s initial supply of 
knowledge,  t ∆Ψ  is the now fully exhausted exogenous increase in knowledge that 
allowed catch up growth, and R&Djt is firm j’s investment in innovation.   
Finding quasirents is now expensive, and the quasirents depend on firm j 
possessing a unique knowledge advantage over other firms.  Such advantages are likely 
to be fleeting, even when protected by patents or secrecy.  Large forecast errors in  ijt η  
due to sloppy financial control and negative biases in  ijt η  due to agency problems are 
very likely to leave  ijt π  below zero.   
  Profitable innovation is difficult.  It requires rare people of unusual ability, both to 
come up with innovations themselves, and to create markets for new products.  Ordinary 
people were able to run corporations, banks, and government economic ministries well 
during catch-up growth because the path ahead was clear and well illuminated.   
Extraordinary people are needed in critical decision-making positions in economies 
growing by creative destruction.  The quality of capital allocation decisions mow matters 
at least as much as the quantity of capital available for investment.  In short, corporate 
governance matters.   
 
6.2    Anglo-American Institutions and Corporate Governance 
  The institutional system in which the quality of corporate governance attains the 
greatest importance is the Anglo-American system.
4   
In the Anglo-American system, innovative new firms can be financed readily - 
either via venture capital pools or via initial public offerings (IPOs) in equity markets.  
Junk bonds also allow debt market financing for these firms.  This system allows 
entrepreneurs to quickly start and expand their own new firms.  This route has been 
followed recently by firms such as Microsoft, Sun Computers, and Intel.  These 
companies did not exist only a couple of decades ago.  
The Anglo-US system also punishes the executives of poorly performing 
established firms.   Morck et al. (1989) find that US CEOs are fired by their boards when 
                                                 
4 See La Porta et al.  (1998) for a detailed comparison of corporate governance practices in different 
countries.     14
their firms do poorly, and that when boards fail to act, the firms become takeover targets.  
Corporate takeovers are, of course, another way to remove the underperforming firm’s 
top managers.  Increasingly, executive and director pay is in the form of stock options, so 
that poor firm performance has immediate and personally important consequences for 
those responsible.  Outside directors, institutional investors, and shareholder rights 
activists all act to expose and oust inept or dishonest top managers.  All of these 
corporate governance mechanisms matter because, when growth by creative destruction 
is essential for continued prosperity, the quality of each major capital allocation decision 
is important.   
 
6.4    Alternatives to the Anglo-American System 
What are the alternatives?  In the Anglo-American system, the leading role of the 
stock market comes at the expense of banks and government ministries.  In principle, 
banks and government officials might be able to identify and finance innovative 
entrepreneurs as well as markets can.  In practice, this is not observed.  Beason and 
Weinstein (1996) show that Japanese government money tended to flow to the least 
economically viable segments of the economy, not to those with the greatest potential.  
This is probably because governments are properly concerned with redistributive welfare.  
However, this concern undermines their ability to fund creative destruction, which 
necessarily entails being responsible for “destruction”.  Morck et al. (2000) show that 
those Japanese firms most dependent on bank financing are also the most economically 
weak.   
Romano (1993), La Porta et al.  (1998) and others argue that Anglo-American 
institutions are superior to the alternatives.  Nonetheless, the long-term economic success 
of countries like France and Germany, which rely heavily on state industrial policies and 
banks, respectively, for capital allocation and corporate governance oversight is 
undeniable.  If Anglo-American institutions per se are not at the crux of growth by 
creative destruction, what is? 
 
7.    The Functional Efficiency of the Stock Market 
The key to the Anglo-American system is the use of the stock market as a central 
information processing device.  IPO financing and the corporate governance mechanisms 
listed above depend critically on stock prices accurately measuring the present value of 
the business activities the firm is undertaking. That is, the stock market must be 
informationally efficient. If stock prices are too high or too low, too much or too little 
money will flow into new businesses via IPOs.  If stock prices rise irrationally, corporate 
executives are rewarded, and if stock prices fall irrationally, corporate executives are 
punished.  The Anglo-American system then fails to deliver economically efficient 
corporate governance.   
 
7.1    Defining Functional Efficiency  
Tobin (1980) refers to the stock market as functionally efficient if it delivers 
economically efficient corporate governance.  Durnev et al.  (2001) call the hypothesis 
that stock price fluctuations cause economically efficient corporate governance as the 
functional form of the efficient markets hypothesis.     15
Some critics of stock markets, most notably Porter (1990), argue that stock prices 
are often “wrong” because of a shareholder myopia effect.  Stock prices are said to rise 
and fall with short-term earnings rather than with the long-term prospects of the firm, and 
this causes an inordinate concern inboard rooms with the short term and a neglect of 
long-term investments.  This contention is flatly false. McConnell and Muscarrella 
(1985) and Chan et al. (1990) find that US firms’ share prices rise sharply when they 
announce increases to long-term investment by raising either capital spending or R&D 
spending.  Hall (1993) finds US firms stock market values to be elevated in proportion to 
their R&D spending.   In short, US shareholders rush to buy the stocks of firms that 
undertake long-term investments.  Shareholders clearly like it when firms take a more 
long-term perspective, and rush to buy the stock of firms that do so.   
Other critics of stock markets like to emphasize the market frenzies and crashes 
that periodically afflict stock markets as economies adjust to the sorts of economic 
dislocations Kindelberger (1978) studies.  This critique deserves more respect.  These 
events clearly occur, and have certainly been associated with economic instability.  It 
seems plausible that stock market manias and crashes reflect deviations from rationality 
of the sort Kindelberger posits.   
However, the issue at hand is not that stock markets are perfectly efficient, but 
that they are better mechanisms for financing growth through creative destruction that the 
alternatives.  The stock market need not be perfectly functionally efficient.  It must only 
be more functionally efficient than the alternatives.   
It is useful in this context to consider different forms of functional efficiency.  
Our original definition, given above, is quite strong, and is unlikely to be true.  We 
therefore refer to it as: 
 
•  THE STRONG FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE EFFICIENT MARKETS 
HYPOTHESIS:  Stock price fluctuations cause economically efficient capital 
allocation. 
 
Restatements of this more likely to fit the real world are: 
 
•  THE WEAK FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE EFFICIENT MARKETS 
HYPOTHESIS:  The stock market is at least as good at delivering economically 
efficient capital allocation as alternative institutional arrangements.   
 
and an alternative restatement, which we dub:  
 
•  THE SEMI-STRONG FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE EFFICIENT MARKETS 
HYPOTHESIS:  The stock market is better at delivering economically efficient 
capital allocation as alternative institutional arrangements.  
 
The precise definitions of  ‘at least as good’ and ‘better’ are best left vague at this point, 
although a definition having to do with the sizes of Harberger triangles lies behind these 
words.   
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7.2      The Curious Characteristics of Japanese Stock Prices 
Financial economists often find it convenient to partition the variation in firms’ 
stock returns into systematic variation and firm-specific variation.  Systematic variation is 
variation common to all stocks in the economy, while firm-specific variation is variation 
unique to the individual firm’s stock.  This partition is usually operationalized with an 
‘asset pricing model.’  The simplest asset pricing model is the market model, which 
posits that firm j’s stock return at time t, denoted rjt is given by 
 
[9]   rr jt j j mt jt =+ + α β ε  
 
where rmt is the return of the market, the parameters αj and βj are fixed for firm j, and εjt 
is a residual.  The variance of rjt then consists of  
 
[10]  ) var( ) var( ) var(
2
jt mt j jt r r ε β + =  
 
We refer to the first term of the righthand side of this equality as the systematic variation 
in stock j’s return, denoted  ) var(
2 2
mt j mj r β σ = .  We call the second term the firm-specific 
variation in stock j’s return, and denote this  ) var(
2
jt j ε σε = .   
  The fraction of the variation in rjt that is systematic is the R
2 of [12] estimated as 
an ordinary least squares linear regression, for   
 











  Morck et al. (2000) perform this variance decomposition for a large number of 
stocks in a large cross section of countries.  Their basic findings are illustrated in Figure 
6.  Almost all the variation in US stocks is firm-specific, and the same is true in almost all 
other advanced industrial countries.  In contrast, a very large fraction of stock return 
variation in emerging economies is systematic variation.   
Indeed, ranking countries by market model R
2 and by per capita GDP  give very 
similar orderings with one prominent exception:  Japan.   Although Japan has the per 
capita GDP of a developed economy, its stock prices resemble those in less developed 
country stock markets.  Japan is marked in balck in Figure 6 to distinguish it from all 
other countries, which are shown in gray.   
 Morck  et al.  (2000) show that their finding is clearly not an artifact of country 
size, stock market size, macroeconomic volatility, econmy diversification, or even the 
systematic component of firm-level earnings variation.  This is beause per capita GDP 
continues to explain their aveage return decomposition, with higher per capita GDP 
linked to less synchronous stock returns, after exhaustively controlling for these and other 
effects.   
They do, however, find that measures of the quality of institutions, such as 
government corruption, respect for the rule of law, efficiency of the judicial system, and 
the like explain returns variation decomposition better than per capita GDP, with low   17
corruption associated.  They interpret their result as indicating that low corruption is 
associated with less synchronous stock returns.   
 
7.3  Stock Price Synchronicity and Functional Efficiency 
Wurgler (2001) measures the tendency of capital to flow towards higher value 
added industries in a cross-section of countries, and interprets a high tendency as 
indicative of high quality capital budgeting.  He finds that countries with more developed 
financial markets allocate capital more efficiently.  Intriguingly, using the market model 
R
2 measure of Morck et al.  (2000), he also finds that capital is allocated more efficiently 
in countries whose stock prices more asynchronously.   
Durnev et al.  (2001) estimate marginal q ratios, as defined in [7] directly for US 
industries, and correlate them with synchronicity, measured as in [11].  They find that 
marginal q ratios tend to cluster near one in industries where stocks’ R
2s are low, and to 
spread out both above and below one in industries where R
2s are high.  Their findings are 
summarized in Figures 6 and 7.   
It follows from Wurgler (2000) and Durnev et al. (2001) that asynchronous stock 
returns are associated with a more functionally efficient stock market.  In short, the worse 
the fit of the asset pricing model, the more functionally efficient the stock market.   
Why is this apparently paradoxical outcome economically sensible?  Morck et al. 
(2000) and Durnev et al. (2001) argue that a functionally efficient stock market must 
distinguish well-run from poorly run firms so as to direct capital to the former rather than 
the latter, so that corporate governance mechanisms can reward the managers of the 
former and punish or oust the managers of the latter, and so that managers can reassess 
their decisions in light of shareholders’ opinions. All of this requires that the stock prices 
of some firms rise as those of other firms fall.  If stocks tend to rise and fall en masse, the 
stock market provides scant help in allocating capital to one firm rather than another.   
But this begs the question of why stock returns are less synchronous in some 
countries than others, after controlling for fundamentals synchronicity, macroeconomic 
instability, etc.  French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) find that firm-specific 
information enters stock prices primarily via the trades of informed private investors.  
This leads Morck et al. (2000) to speculate that traders possessing information about 
specific firms are rarer in some countries than others.  They propose that more 
widespread corruption, less respect for the rule of law, and less efficient judicial systems 
make gathering and processing information about individual companies less 
remunerative.  This environment renders corporate information releases less trustworthy, 
raising the cost of estimating fundamental values. This raises the costs of firm-specific 
stock arbitrage.  It also breaks the link between earnings and dividends, so that even if 
investors could predict the prospects of individual firms, that information might not help 
in predicting stock prices.  This lowers the return of firm-specific stock arbitrage.   
Finally, an absence of informed trading leaves noise traders free to move prices.  De 
Long  et al. (19xx) show that a noise trader dominated stock market should exhibit 
heightened systematic returns variation relative to systematic fundamentals variation.   
This is because noise traders are prone to herding, and tend to either buy en masse or sell 
en masse.  Thus, more information-laden stock prices move more asynchronously.  
The high degree of synchronicity in Japanese stock returns can therefore be taken 
as a sign of ‘information lite’ stock prices.  To the extent that Japanese capital allocation   18
depends on stock price movements, this is indicative of poor quality capital allocation.  
Even if capital budgeting decisions in Japan have been little influenced by stock prices in 
the past, during Japan’s catch-up growth, they may become more important in the future. 
Certainly, if Japan begins to rely more on its stock market and less on banks and 
governments for capital allocation, the information content of its stock prices is 
important.  
 
7.    Policy Implications for Japan 
We do not necessarily propose that Japan adopt Anglo-American institutions.   
Romano (1993) rightly points out that a country cannot pick and choose particular 
institutional arrangements from other countries, for laws, regulations, and customs are all 
interdependent.  One cannot adopt American corporate governance laws without a stock 
market, legal system, disclosure rules, and general corporate governance behavior code 
that match those of the US.  As many emerging economies are discovering, finely crafted 
laws and regulations quickly become dead letters without a supportive environment.   
Instead, we cautiously point out what we think to be the key problems facing 
Japan now.   
First, Japan’s institutions experienced stress as the country approached the 
knowledge frontier, and Japan’s banks and government responded by artificially 
depressing the cost of capital for many years to prolong catch up growth.  Much of this 
growth was probably value destroying, with negative NPVs and negative economic 
profits when evaluated at true costs of capital.  This short-term fix leaves Japan’s 
macroeconomy with pervasive excess capacity problems.  Since this excess capacity is 
extensive and was probably never economically justifiable, it is unlikely that 
conventional macroeconomic stimuli can reduce it greatly in the short or even medium 
terms.     
Second, because Japan’s great banking houses financed much of this excess 
capacity, they are also severely overextended.  This leaves them unable to move into 
venture capital funds, high tech start-ups, or other vehicles used elsewhere to finance 
creative destruction.   
Third, since Japan has clearly converged with the world’s most advanced 
industrial economies, further catch-up growth through capital accumulation is not 
possible.  Pushing interest rates down is not a solution, and is likely to cause more trouble 
in the future as the economy must absorb even more uneconomic excess capacity. 
Fourth, Japan need more informed capital allocation decisions in the future.  A 
more functionally efficient stock market is one way to bring this about.  Figure 6 shows 
that the most asynchronous stock prices are to be found in the United States.  The next 
most asynchronous stock returns are those of Ireland, followed by those of Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  All six of these low R
2 economies have 
legal traditions based on British Common Law and use stock markets to allocate capital.  
However, many countries without Anglo-American institutions, such as France, 
Denmark, Austria, and Holland also have asynchronous stock prices and consequently, 
can be expected to have relatively high quality capital allocation decisions.  Morck et al.  
(2000) show that shareholder rights laws, combined with a general climate of honesty in 
government and the judiciary, seem sufficient to induce the information gathering and 
informed trading that makes stock markets more functionally efficient.     19
Finally, Japan must rerig itself for creative destruction.  Regardless of whether it 
moves closer to Anglo-American institutions or not, corporate governance must become a 
central focus of institutions throughout the Japanese economy.  In the past, the 
qualifications for being a top corporate executive sensibly included the skills needed to 
raise capital from banks or the government.  Networking, social sophistication, and other 
such skills were paramount.  Being able to tell a good investment from a bad one was 
rightly seen as less important.  Being innovative was, again rightly, seen as irrelevant.   
Now, the situation has inverted, and top executives critically need to be able to 
tell good investments from bad one, to be innovative, and to encourage innovation by 
others.  These two skill sets are radically different.  This would seem to imply that Japan 
desperately needs an extensive turnover of corporate leaders, so that people with the right 
skills are in charge of capital allocation.   
If the government and the banks are to retain their key roles in capital allocation, 
the same applies to them.   
Unfortunately, the easily available quasirents of catch-up growth let Japan’s 
corporations, banks, and government become inflexible and rife with entrenched, but 
unproductive, layers of management.  The elite of Japan’s corporate world are probably 
best regarded as entrenched vested interests, for instances of CEOs being fired 
notwithstanding, the positions of most top executives in Japan are very secure by world 
standards.  Hostile takeovers are unknown, institutional investors are quiescent, boards 
are consensus-oriented, and shareholder rights are weak.    
The current tendency to remove intercorporate cross holdings is a start.  But this is only a 
single step.  The ultimate goal must be new corporate, banking and government decision-
makers with new skills appropriate to creative destruction.  Some means must be found to 
remove these entrenched past leaders.  Adopting more of an Anglo-American 
institutional framework is one possible way of doing this.  But Japanese ingenuity may 
construct another.   
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 5 
The Japanese Stock Market 
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Figure 5 
Variance Decomposition of Japanese Stock Returns 














































The Quality of Capital Budgeting Across US Industries, as Measured by the Deviation of Marginal Tobin’s q from One with 
Industries Grouped by Industry-Average Firm-Level Market Model R
2.  A low R
2 Indicates High Firm-specific Return Variation 
Relative to Market and Industry-related Variation 
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Figure 3 
The Quality of Capital Budgeting Across US Industries, as Measured by the Deviation of Marginal Tobin’s q from One with 
Industries Grouped by Industry-Average Firm-Level Market Model R
2.  A low R
2 Indicates a High Firm-specific Return Variation 
Relative to Market and Industry-related Variation 











































Fraction of Industries with Marginal q Significantly Different from One
fraction significantly below 1 fraction significantly above 1
 
Notes for Figure 3. This figure presents the relationship between the quality of capital budgeting variables (( & q -1)
2  and | & q  -1|) and relative firm-specific stock return 
variation. The length of a bar is equal to the proportion of corresponding variable significantly below or above 1 at 10% level. Source - Durnev et al.  (2001). 